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INTERLOCUTORY DEFENDANT APPEALS UNDER SECTION
75(2)(c) OF THE ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE ACT
A recent application of Section 75(2)(c) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,
resulted in a defendant's interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois
under the guise of a final order.2 The section gives a party whose judgment
in the trial court has been reversed and remanded by the appellate court the
right to make the judgment final by moving to strike the remanding portion
of the judgment and by filing an affidavit that he is unable to adduce other evi-
dence and that he waives his right to a new trial. The purpose of the section is to
"streamline litigation and prevent costly and burdensome retrials of cases
which may later be found to be predicated upon bad law. ... ."3 By allowing a
party to make final an otherwise interlocutory order,4 the statute permits a
litigant who has had his judgment reversed by an appellate court to avoid
unnecessary costs and delay by immediately obtaining the right to request a
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 75(2)(c) (1959): "In any case heard and determined in the
trial court upon actual trial in which the Appellate Court upon appeal from the final judg-
ment or decree entered in the cause in the trial court reverses the judgment or decree and
remands the cause for a new trial or hearing, and in which the party in whose favor the trial
court's judgment or decree was rendered presents to and files with the Appellate Court an
affidavit stating that he will be unable on a future trial or hearing to adduce other or ad-
ditional evidence, facts or circumstances than were adduced in the trial court and expressly
waiving the right to a new trial or hearing and consenting and requesting that the portion
of the judgment of the Appellate Court remanding the cause for new trial or hearing be de-
leted and stricken from the judgment of the Appellate Court, then that court upon motion
shall amend its judgment by striking out the portion thereof remanding the cause for new
trial or hearing. Thereupon it is competent for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal
from such final judgment of reversal for its review...."
2 John v. Tribune Co., Civil No. 36450, IIl. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1962,petition for rehearing
filed. In an action for libel the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint. The
appellate court reversed and remanded. 19 111. App. 2d 547, 154 N.E.2d 862 (1958). The
ensuing trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The appellate court again reversed
and remanded, this time on the ground, inter alia, that errors in the admission and ex-
clusion of evidence entitled plaintiff to a new trial. 28 111. App. 2d 300, 171 N.E.2d 432
(1960). Defendant filed a motion with accompanying affidavit pursuant to § 75(2)(c) of
the Civil Practice Act which was denied by the appellate court. It then filed a petition in
the supreme court for an ancillary writ of mandamus and leave to appeal. The court grant-
ed the writ and ordered the appellate court to strike the remand provision of its decree.
In reinstating the original trial court decision dismissing the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action, the court held that the provisions of section 75(2)(c) were available to
defendants as well as to plaintiffs. Two justices dissented on the ground that the defendant
failed to present a final order and therefore leave to appeal had been improvidently granted.
3 Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 111. 2d 186, 197, 142 N.E.2d 104, 112, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 837 (1957).
4 Wright v. Risser, 378 Ill. 72, 37 N.E.2d 778 (1942) (judgment reversing and remanding
a cause not a final order).
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hearing before the supreme court. 5 After the remand is stricken, an appeal-
able judgment of reversal remains.
If this route were unavailable, a supreme court determination would have
to be preceded by a new trial and a second hearing before the appellate court.
The trial court would presumably rule in accordance with the first appellate
court decision; this ruling would then be affirmed by the appellate court.
In the case of a plaintiff whose trial court verdict is reversed and remanded
in the appellate court, the use of section 75(2)(c) presents no difficulty. For
example, plaintiff A wins a judgment in the trial court. The appellate court
reverses and remands on the basis of improper evidence introduced by A.
A realizes that his case fails without the contested evidence. Rather than un-
dertake a new trial, with the resulting costs and with no chance to win, A
moves to strike the remand portion of the judgment and waives his right to
a new trial, leaving only a final order of reversal. He then moves for leave to
appeal to the supreme court. If the court grants leave and affirms the appel-
late court decision that the evidence is inadmissible, A has lost, but he has
not been required to undergo an unnecessary trial and appeal before obtain-
ing a hearing before the highest court. If the supreme court reverses the
appellate court, the trial court judgment is reinstated. 6 Of course, if the high
court should refuse to grant leave to appeal, then the final order of the appel-
late court remains. 7
Although the wording of the statute appears to make the election equally
available to plaintiffs and defendants, the procedural device as presented in
the statute had, until John v. Tribune Co.,8 been exclusively used by plain-
tiffs.9 The appeal under section 75(2)(c) in John v. Tribune, however, seemed
to require a full interpretation of the statute as applied to defendants who
seek its benefits. Instead, the court, in deciding that the section was applicable
to the defendant and then reinstating the trial court's decision, chose to post-
pone resolutions of the problems which are inherent in such a determination.
The inadequacy of helpful precedent and the peculiar problems arising from
the use of the provision by a defendant indicate the need to consider the pos-
5 People v. McArdle, 370 Ill. 513, 19 N.E.2d 328 (1939) (supreme court has jurisdiction
to review only final judgments of the appellate courts); Cowen v. Harding Hotel Co., 396
I11. 470, 72 N.E.2d 177 (1947). The wisdom of this widely-recognized rule is discussed in
Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Y.'.LE L.J. 539 (1931); Note, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 240 (1947).
6 Conner v. Borland-Grannis Co., 294 Ill. 58,128 N.E. 317 (1920); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
2417 (5th ed. 1925).
7 Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 Ill. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104, cert. denied, 355 U.S
837 (1957).
8 Civil No. 36450, Il. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1962.
9 E.g., Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 Il. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104, cert. denied, 355
U.S. 837 (1957); Robinson v. Workman, 9 Il. 2d 420, 137 N.E.2d 804 (1956); Lees v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry., 409 Ill. 536, 100 N.E.2d 653 (1951); Mabee v. Sutliff & Case Co., 404 IIl.
27, 88 N.E.2d 12 (1949); Devine v. Pfaelzer, 277 Ill. 255, 115 N.E. 126 (1917).
sible application of the statute in this situation in light of its avowed purpose.
This discussion, therefore, will consider the general background and specific
application of the provision in an attempt to determine the interpretation that
would most closely comply with the purpose of the legislation and to explore
possible legislative modifications that might increase its effectiveness when
used by defendants.
A predecessor of section 75(2)(c) was adopted in 1907.10 The section was
held unconstitutional in Hayward v. Sencenbaughnl on the ground that the
provision gave the court power to render a final judgment against one party
while not against the other12 and was thus class legislation since it placed the
parties on unequal footing in bringing an appeal. The current section appears
to avoid the Hayward problem by requiring that the remand provision in the
appellate court judgment be stricken, thus making the decision appealed from
a final one.13
After the Hayward case, enterprising lawyers conceived the method of
rendering final an otherwise interlocutory order by moving to strike a remand,
thus waiving the right to a new trial, on the ground that their clients could
adduce no new evidence in another trial. Disposition of such motions was left
solely to the discretion of the appellate court. If granted by the appellate
court, the motion to strike the remandment portion of the judgment left a
final appealable order.14 This made possible an immediate hearing before the
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 119 (1908). It provided, in part, "And appeals shall also be
allowed from the judgment of the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court, in all cases where
such judgment of the Appellate Court is that the judgment of the trial court be reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial, if the party so appealing will stipulate in writing, at
the time of praying the appeal, that final judgment in the case may be entered in the Supreme
Court against him if such appeal is not prosecuted with effect."
11235 Ill. 580, 85 N.E. 939 (1908). The section was repealed in 1909. ILL. LAws 1909, at
305.
12 The court's interpretation of its lack of power to render a final iudgment against the
party who had won a reversal in the appellate court and had not signed the stipulation re-
quired of the reversed litigant is at best confusing and strained. The court mentions that if
it were to reverse the appellate court decision it would be forced either to remand the cause
to the trial court or to affirm the trial court judgment. Id. at 582, 85 N.E. at 940. Why the
court would find it necessary to remand to the trial court is not apparent since its only
function was to decide whether the appellate court was correct in reversing the trial court
for alleged errors. If the appellate court was correct, the case was resolved by the appellant's
stipulation allowing a final judgment against him by the supreme court. Conversely, if the
supreme court reversed the appellate court, it was saying that the trial court was correct.
Therefore an affirmation of the trial court's verdict was proper. Such an affirmation was a
final judgment. See Blanchard v. Lewis, 414 Ill. 515, 112 N.E.2d 167 (1953), where the de-
fendant had signed a stipulation which was incorporated into the appellate court decree,
thus making it a final order prior to the supreme court determination. The decision of the
court was to reverse the appellate court and to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
13 This makes the judgment final, at least with regard to a plaintiff whose judgment has
been reversed.
14 Such an appeal is not a matter of right; but leave to appeal must be granted by the
supreme court. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 75(2)(c) (1959).
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supreme court on the ruling reversed by the appellate court. This method
of making final those orders which would otherwise be interlocutory was
accepted by the courts for many years15 and was finally codified in section
75(2)(c).16
The problem inherent in a defendant's use of the section is revealed by
examining the effect of his waiver on the posture of the case. The consequences
to a defendant differ substantially from those that result when a plaintiff
waives remand. In the plaintiff's case, the action is completed if the supreme
court decides against him. A supreme court affirmance against a defendant,
however, does not conclude the litigation. 17
In John v. Tribune the second appellate court reversal and remand was
based on errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence in the trial court.
Upon striking the remandment, only a reversal order remained. If, instead of
reversing, the supreme court had affirmed the appellate court, the plaintiff
would surely have sought a new trial. The reversal of the trial court verdict
for the defendant gives the plaintiff neither a verdict nor a money judgment.
In the John case, the court relied on the explicit words of the statute to apply
the benefits to "any party in whose favor the trial court's judgment was
rendered.. . .,18 But a plaintiff-user must waive his valuable right to a new
Is Devine v.-Pfaelzer, 277 Ill. 255, 115 N.E. 126 (1917).
16 The practice of making final an otherwise interlocutory decree by striking the remand-
ment was codified in the 1941 amendment to § 75.2 ILL. LAWS 1941, at 467.
17 In John v. Tribune the court specifically refused to treat this problem. "Since jurisdic-
tion exists pursuant to 75(2)(c) and the trial court must be affirmed, no question of the con-
sequence of an affirmance of the Appellate Court... is reached." Civil No. 36450, Ill. Sup.
Ct., Jan. 23, 1962. The benefits arising from a decision on the merits in this particular situa-
tion may explain the majority's decision to postpone dealing with those problems which may
result in the section's being inapplicable to defendants. In describing such benefits of section
75(2)(c) in the circumstances of the John case, the court said: "On the first appeal.. . the Ap-
pellate Court erroneously held that whether the defendant's articles were subject to the con-
struction claimed by plaintiff... was one of fact rather than law. After remandment, trial,
verdict, and judgment for defendant the Appellate Court again held in effect that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action. It is reasonable to assume that a second trial ... would
prompt a third appeal and possibly another remand. The parties could remain on such a
treadmill indefinitely through any number ... of remandments by the Appellate Court. [The]
case might never be reviewed by this court ... until a judgment is entered in the trial court
which is not reversed or remanded.... Only then could we stop the fruitless cycle by a de-
termination that the complaint upon which the numerous trials were predicated never stated
a cause of action." Id. The reduction in fruitless litigation achieved in John v. Tribune may
well result in an increase in such litigation in the supreme court because of the interlocutory
nature of defendant appeals under section 75(2)(c). See note 24 infra.
The court could have reached, in effect, the same substantive result and at the same time
dealt fully with the problems raised by a defendant's use of the section. This could have
been accomplished even if it reached the conclusions that the section is not available in its
present form to such applicants. It is not unknown for a court to manifest its opinion on
the merits while ruling that it lacks jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803). Cf. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 75(2)(c) (1959) (Emphasis added.)
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trial,19 while a defendant-user is required to surrender no substantial equiva-
lent.
In addition to waiving a new trial, the defendant has sworn that he will be
unable "to adduce other or additional evidence, facts or circumstances than
were adduced in the trial court... "20 Should the supreme court affirm the
appellate court, the net effect of the affidavit could be rendered meaningless
in the new trial demanded by the plaintiff. For example, a literal interpreta-
tion of the statutory terms would seem to require that even if the plaintiff
introduces wholly new evidence, the defendant is bound not to add to his evi-
dence presented in the original trial. Such an interpretation, however, is im-
probable. Also the testimony of the defendant's witnesses would appear to
be confined by the contents of the first trial.21 The means of effecting such a
restriction during a second trial, however, are likewise unclear. Unless a solu-
tion to such difficulties can be devised, the defendant's affidavit will be totally
ineffective.
It is conceivable, in light of the interpretation in John v. Tribune, that every
defendant whose verdict has been reversed in the appellate court will seek
leave to appeal under section 75(2)(c), since he can, in reality, lose nothing,
while gaining an opportunity to have his original verdict reinstated by the
supreme court. Thus the net effect is to allow an interlocutory appeal to the
defendant by means of a fictitious "final" order of reversal.
The rule that only final orders are appealable22 is not without exception.23
19 The value of a new trial to the plaintiff would appear to be negligible since he has
signed an affidavit stating that he has no additional evidence to adduce. However, the
supreme court in Bowman seemed to suggest that the clause is used only as a formal reason
for waiving a new trial. The court discusses the risk that a plaintiff-user is taking by giving
up a trial. "in which more evidence may be offered and those errors of law which deprive
plaintiff of her judgment may be corrected ..." This statement is particularly curious since
the court had previously discussed the terms of the affidavit. 11 IUl. 2d at 193, 104 N.E.2d
at 110.
Such treatment of the affidavit results in no problems when a plaintiff is the applicant
since there is no possibility of a new trial occurring. A defendant's use which will result in
another trial if the court affirms the appellate decision will bring the affidavit's terms into
prominence. See text at note 18 supra.
20 IL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 75(2)(c) (1959).
21 It does not seem likely, despite the fears expressed by the defendant in John v. Tribune,
that the defense witnesses would be forced to repeat the exact words used in the prior trial.
Brief for Appellants in Support of Motion for Mandamus, p. 8.
22 Appellate courts hold firm to the final order doctrine in order to eliminate piecemeal
appeals which could cause useless delay in the judicial process. A final decision will at least
end the complaints of the winning litigant about the court's errors adverse to him, and as
to his opponent, no more errors will present themselves which would result in additional
interlocutory appeals. Roberts v. Stagg, I Nott & Mc. 429 (S.C. 1819). On the other hand,
if certain appeals were allowed, prior to the final judgment, on the validity of doubtful deci-
sions by the lower court, much litigation could be avoided in the event the appellate court
were to hold such decisions to be error. See Crick, supra note 5, at 558, where the suggestion
is made that instead of arguing whether a decision is final or not, the question should be
19621
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There are several instances in which purely interlocutory decrees are treated
as final in order to allow immediate appeals. 24 A 1958 amendment 2S has en-
abled the federal system to allow interlocutory appeals to a court of appeals
in certain cases not otherwise appealable. The amendment makes the motion
for such appeal wholly dependent upon the discretion of first the district judge
and then the appellate court. The purpose of the federal provision is much the
same as that of section 75(2)(c): to avoid protracted and expensive litigation
which may be needless because based on incorrect law.26 The element of dis-
cretion involved in the supreme court's determination of whether to grant
leave to appeal is similar to that of the federal courts of appeal. This would
seem to indicate that even though the defendant has in reality only an inter-
locutory decree, the supreme court will choose, as it did in John v. Tribune, to
recognize his eligibility to appeal. There are factors, however, which indicate
that the statutory provisions are not directly analogous. While other statutes 27
allow interlocutory appeals to the first level of appellate courts, none allows
such appeals to the highest court in the jurisdiction. Also, the two Illinois
statutes28 which permit certain interlocutory appeals specify that the judg-
ment of the appellate court is not reviewable. Finally, despite the check on
the number and kinds of appeals supplied by the thoughtful exercise of
supreme court discretion, the court has already expressed an unwillingness to
hear cases where there has been no final judgment:
whether this is the sort of decision which the appellate court wishes to hear. This suggestion
is carried out to a limited extent by the federal, Iowa, and Minnesota statutes. See note 25
infra.
23 The rule has been modified by statute to allow certain types of interlocutory appeals.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 78 (1959) (appeal from interlocutory order granting, modifying,
refusing, dissolving or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction, or appointing or refus-
ing to appoint, or giving or refusing to give additional powers to a receiver). See also, e.g.,
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODL § 963; TFx. Rav. Cix'. STAT. art. 2250 (1948).
24 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 77 (1959); Kavenaugh v. Washburn, 387 Ill. 204, 56 N.E.2d
420 (1944). (the word "final" applied to order granting a new trial and used in the sense of
being appealable); Liebbrand v. Butler, 88 Ohio App. 185, 97 N.E.2d 80 (1950) (order grant-
ing a new trial a final order from which appeal may be taken).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958): "When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal ... from such order .... (Emphasis added.)
For similar discretionary interlocutory appeals see IowA R. Civ. P. § 332 (1958); MINN.
STAT. § 605.09(4) (1957).
26 H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1958).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1958) limits interlocutory appeals to certain cases involving
(1) injunctions, (2) receiverships, (3) admiralty, and (4) patents which are final except for
accounting.
28 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 77, 78 (1959).
The second element necessary to come under paragraph (2)(c) is that the
affidavit of the party who won the case below, and whose case has been
reversed and remanded, will present a question upon which the Appellate
Court can render a final judgment, because in no event can an appeal be
taken from the Appellate to the Supreme Court unless the judgment is
final... 29
This emphasis on finality, asserted again in Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,30
was disregarded by the majority in John v. Tribune,31 where the court noted
that the Illinois constitution confers jurisdiction on the supreme court "in
such other cases as may be provided by law." 32 Since section 75(2)(c) authorized
an appeal in the circumstances of the John case, the result is an interlocutory
appeal from a judgment under a statute designed to make final just such judg-
ments. It is doubtful that such a result was the intention of the legislature in
enacting the section. No other provision of the Civil Practice Act allows
interlocutory appeals to the supreme court.33
The extent of applicability is further clouded by the court's recent discussion
of the right of plaintiffs to use the device in certain cases. A dictum in Lees
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.,34 two justices dissenting, would limit the section's use
to cases where the cause is reversed and remanded for insufficient evidence.
This doctrine was specifically rejected in the Bowman case35 with three justices
dissenting. The court said:
A careful reading of section 75(2)(c) reveals that by its terms it does not
limit the right to strike the remanding order to cases where the Appel-
late Court reverses for insufficient evidence, or for any other particular
grounds. The statute is all encompassing, and grants the right to strike
the remanding portion of the order in all cases where the Appellate Court
reverses and remands a cause for a new trial, provided the party in whose
favor judgment was originally entered in the trial court files the requisite
affidavit .... 36
The court then enumerated cases, 37 decided under both the statute and its
common law equivalent, where appeals were allowed when trial errors other
29 Lees v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 409 Il. 536, 542, 100 N.E.2d 653, 656 (1951). (Emphasis
added.)
30 I1 Ill. 2d 186, 189, 142 N.E.2d 104, 108, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957). See Olson v.
Chicago Transit Authority, I Ill. 2d 83, 87, 115 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1953) (final judgment rule
embodied in more than a century of common and statutory law in Illinois).
31 Civil No. 36450, Ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1962.
32 111. Const. art. VI, § 11. 33 See statutes cited note 28 supra.
34 409 Ill. 536, 543, 100 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1951).
35 11111. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957).
36 Id. at 192-93, 142 N.E.2d at 110. (All italicized in original.)
37Id. at 195, 142 N.E.2d at 11; Hartley v. Red Ball Transit Co., 344 Ill. 534, 176 N.E.
751 (1931) (errors in submission of evidence); Blanchard v. Lewis, 414 . 515, 112 N.E.2d
157 (1953).
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than insufficiency of evidence had occurred. Prior to codification in section
75(2)(c), the question of whether or not to strike the remanding portion of a
judgment in order to grant the reversed party leave to appeal was a matter
for the appellate court's discretion.38 Section 75(2)(c), of course, makes strik-
ing mandatory upon the appellate court in all cases where the reversed party
files the proper motion and affidavit.39 The dissenters argued that in cases
where a new trial is ordered because of numerous errors which deprive the
party of a fair trial the appellate court is not obligated to strike the re-
mandment.40 The closeness of the vote on the mandatory nature of section
75(2)(c) indicates further difficulty for a defendant attempting to use the sec-
tion upon the basis of an illusory final order.
There is no constitutional problem involved in allowing the plaintiff to use
section 75(2)(c) while not allowing the defendant to do so. 41 Two cases, de-
cided prior to John v. Tribune, indicate that, despite the absence of a consti-
tutional requirement that the statute applies to defendants as well as plain-
tiffs, and despite the described difficulties, the section is available to defend-
ants in its present form. In Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp. v. Lewis,42 plaintiff sued
upon a contract and defendant won a directed verdict. The appellate court
reversed and remanded. 43 The second trial brought a jury verdict for the de-
fendant; again the appellate court reversed and remanded.44 The third trial
again found the jury holding for the defendant. Reversing and remanding for
the third time, the court said, "Should defendant desire to avail himself of the
above provision, he should file a motion and affidavit in accordance with the
paragraph quoted from sec. 75 of the Civil Practice Act."45 The defendant,
however, failed to file the necessary motion and affidavit. The issue was thus
never posed for adjudication.
38 Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 75 (Smith-
Hurd 1956).
39 Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 Ill. 2d 186, 197, 142 N.E.2d 104, 109, cert. denied,
355 U.S. 837 (1957).
40 Id. at 216, 142 N.E.2d at 122. (Schaefer, Hershey, and Davis, J. J.)
41 The Supreme Court has specifically overruled the Hayward case, see note 11, supra,
"to the extent that it may be thought to hold that review by this court may not be condi-
tioned upon the appellant's willingness to forego a new trial and thus make final the judg-
ment of the Appellate Court. We have upheld a statute giving a right of appeal to the de-
fendant from an interlocutory decree appointing a receiver or granting an injunction while
denying the plaintiff an appeal from an order refusing to grant the same relief.... A classi-
fication based upon the finality of the judgment sought to be reviewed is no less reasonable
than that sustained in those cases." Olson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 1111. 2d 83, 89, 115
115 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1953) (Emphasis is added.)
42 326 I1. App. 117, 61 N.E.2d 297 (1945) (errors in admission of evidence).
43 301 III. App. 459, 23 N.E.2d 243 (1939) (plaintiff's evidence presented prima facie
case).
44 326 Ill. App. 84, 61 N.E.2d 290 (1945) (numerous trial errors).
45 326 Ill. App. at 134, 61 N.E.2d at 304 (after quoting § 75(2)(c)).
In Blanchard v. Lewis,46 defendant used the section but not according to
its literal terms, for he filed a stipulation, incorporated into the appellate
court decree, as to liability for an exact amount of damages.47 Such stipula-
tion is not required by the words of the statute,48 but the case does indicate
that the supreme court had not assumed an inflexible position against a de-
fendant using section 75(2)(c). This stipulation placed the defendant in the
same category as a plaintiff-user of the section in that the possibility of a new
trial was avoided by the agreement as to liability and damages inserted into
the appellate court's order of reversal. A new trial would not be necessary
even if the supreme court should affirm the appellate court's reversal of de-
fendant's verdict.49
The dissent in John v. TribunesO suggests another possible interpretation of
the section. The dissenters' objection to jurisdiction was based on the alleged
failure of the defendant to fulfill the statutory requirement of an express
waiver of the right to a new trial or hearing. The defendant's affidavit stated
that while it waived its right to a new trial, nothing contained therein was a
consent to the entry of any money judgment against it. In basing their objec-
tion on this clause, the dissenters imply that the defendant's waiver of a new
trial should be construed as a consent to a judgment of liability for the full
amount of plaintiff's claim if the appellate court's reversal is affirmed. This
interpretation would result in a truly final order being appealed and at the
same time could cause the waiver of the new trial under the remandment to
have the same effect on the defendant as on the plaintiff under the section.
By requiring effective waiver, the court would restrict the number of requests
for leave to appeal to those which the parties believe to be important enough
to exchange for their right to a new trial. Despite the possible value of such
restriction, there is no precedent for implying a consent requirement under
section 75(2)(c).
A means of resolving the problems raised by a defendant's use of section
75(2)(c) is suggested by the New York statute allowing appeals from an order
46 414 111. 515, 112 N.E.2d 167 (1953). A fear that the court would construe the statute as
inapplicable to defendants may have been the reason for defendant's stipulation with regard
to liability and damages. The stipulation was incorporated into the appellate court's judg-
ment so that if the supreme court affirmed, the case would be resolved as to all parties. The
action was upon a contract and the damage amount was evidently not an issue since the
stipulation was for the odd amount of $52,154.63. The supreme court in Bowman erroneous-
ly treats the Blanchard case as if it were the plaintiff whose verdict was reversed.
47 Record, pp. 145-46.
48 The effect of the stipulation, signed by both litigants, as to liability for a set amount of
damages is discussed in text at note 55 infra.
49 Since the stipulation was wholly voluntary, the problems raised by defendant's use of
the section have never been considered by the court.
so Civil No. 36450, IM. Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1962 (Schaefer and Hershey, J. J.).
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granting a new trial.51 An appellant from such order must stipulate that upon
affirmance he consents to a final judgment against him.52 The provision is
intended to aid those litigants who prevailed at the trial and who are satisfied
to have that verdict sustained or fail altogether in their action or defense.5 3
If the first appellate decision is affirmed, the judgment in the New York Court
of Appeals is thus founded solely upon the consent of the party making the
stipulation.54 The stipulation means that affirmance will result in damages to
the full extent of the plaintiff's complaint. 55
Amending section 75(2)(c) to contain a stipulation clause similar to the one
voluntarily used in the Blanchard case will allow defendants to use the statute,
but not without the same risks as plaintiff-users. By incorporating the stipula-
tion into the appellate court's order, there can be no doubt as to the finality of
the order. Such an amendment would limit the availability of section 75(2)(c)
to those cases where it would be most useful: when a litigant's whole defense
has been ruled out by the appellate court. In fact, the stipulation requirement
would further limit its use to cases in which the damages are liquidated or a
settlement as to damages is reached prior to entering the stipulation and
waiver affidavit. That this would drastically reduce the number of defendant
appeals under section 75(2)(c) is not necessarily an undesirable result if it is
assumed that only those cases which can be finally determined by a supreme
court decision are proper subjects for the section's benefits.
The supreme court in future cases interpreting section 75(2)(c) has various
alternatives from which to choose. The court can decide, as it did in John v.
Tribune, that defendants can have what amounts to an interlocutory appeal,
since such party's waiver of a new trial is a mere fiction, and depend upon the
court's discretionary powers under the leave to appeal doctrine to limit the
application of the section to only important cases. Alternatively, the court
can cling to the traditional doctrine of finality in appealable decrees and thus
render the statute inapplicable to defendants. Such a holding, however, would
ignore the professed aim of the legislation since the laudable purpose of re-
ducing litigation costs and unnecessary delay is no less praiseworthy when
applied to a defendant.56 The two further possibilities involve a somewhat
51 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr. § 588: "Appeal to Court of Appeals as of right lies only, (3) from
an order of the Appellate Division granting... or affirming... a new trial or hearing in
an action ... commenced in the Supreme Court, a county court .... court of claims...
where the appellant stipulates that upon affirmance, judgment or order absolute shall be
rendered against him; and upon such appeal the court of appeals shall affirm and renderjudgment or order absolute against the appellant unless it determines that the Appellate
Division erred as a matter of law ......
52 United Sec. Corp. v. Suchman, 307 N.Y. 48, 119 N.E.2d 881 (1954).
53 Lanman v. Lewiston R.R., 18 N.Y. 493 (1859).
54 Canfield v. Elmer E. Harris & Co., 252 N.Y. 502, 170 N.E. 121 (1930).
55 City Trust, S.D. & S. Co. v. American Brewing Co., 182 N.Y. 285, 74 N.E 948 (1905),
56 See note 17 supra and text accompanying note 45 supra.
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forced construction of the present terms of the section or an actual legislative
enactment to require consent to liability and damages in order to make the
benefits of the section available solely to a limited number of defendants who
are willing to risk their chances of regaining their verdict at a new trial on the
probability of a supreme court reversal of the appellate court decision. The
conflicting precedents, which on one hand suggest that defendants may avail
themselves of the section, 57 while on the other hand place emphasis on the
necessity for a final appealable decree in order to use section 75(2)(c),S8 make
the ultimate interpretation by the supreme court unclear. Effective use of the
provision by practitioners as well as a reasonable evaluation of the present
statute and a rational consideration of possible modification can be achieved
only if based upon a definitive statement of the applicability of section
75(2)(c).
57 John v. Tribune Co., No. 36450, I1. Sup. Ct.,Jan. 23,1962; Reilly Tar& Chem. Corp.
v. Lewis, 326 111. App. 117, 61 N.E.2d 297 (1945).
58 Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 11 III. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104, cert. denied, 355 U.S.
837 (1957); Lees v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 409 Il. 536, 100 N.E.2d 653 (1951).
